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1.	Introduction	
Dellsén	(2017)	has	recently	argued	for	an	understanding-based	account	of	scientific	
progress,	the	noetic	account,	according	to	which	science	(or	a	particular	scientific	discipline)	
makes	cognitive	progress	precisely	when	it	increases	our	understanding	of	some	aspect	of	
the	world.	Dellsén	contrasts	this	account	with	Bird’s	(2007,	2015)	epistemic	account,	
according	to	which	such	progress	is	made	precisely	when	our	knowledge	of	the	world	is	
increased	or	accumulated.	In	a	recent	paper,	Park	(2017)	criticizes	various	aspects	of	
Dellsén’s	account	and	his	arguments	in	favor	of	the	noetic	account	as	against	Bird’s	
epistemic	account.	This	paper	responds	to	Park’s	objections.	Since	a	number	of	Park’s	
arguments	rely	on	the	idea	that	scientific	progress	may	merely	consists	in	“achieving	the	
means	to	increase	knowledge”	(Park	2017:	570),	I	will	start	by	discussing	this	“means-end	
thesis”.	
	
2.	Scientific	progress	vs.	promotion	of	progress	
Bird’s	original	and	most	frequently	used	formulation	of	the	epistemic	account	simply	says	
that	an	episode	in	science	is	progressive	precisely	when	there	is	more	knowledge	at	the	end	
of	the	episode	than	at	the	beginning	(e.g.,	Bird	2007:	64).	In	his	original	paper,	Bird	also	
added	that	certain	means	to	achieving	knowledge	may	also	count	as	progressive	(Bird	2007:	
83).	However,	Bird	(2008)	later	responded	to	an	objection	made	by	Rowbottom	(2008)	by	
insisting	that	“we	must	distinguish	what	constitutes	progress	from	what	promotes	it”	(Bird	
2008:	280).	Thus	Bird’s	considered	view	appears	to	be	that	obtaining	a	mere	means	to	
accumulate	knowledge	–	i.e.,	merely	promoting	the	accumulation	of	knowledge	–	is	not	by	
itself	sufficient	for	scientific	progress.1	
In	spite	of	this,	Park	formulates	the	epistemic	account	as	“the	suggestion	that	
scientific	progress	consists	in	increasing	knowledge	or	in	achieving	a	means	to	increase	
knowledge”	(Park	2017:	570	–	my	emphasis),	referring	to	the	second	disjunct	as	“the	means-
end	thesis”.	The	difference	between	Park	and	Bird	may	seem	small,	but	in	fact	Park	
immediately	infers	that	even	if	all	past	attempts	to	formulate	a	true	theory	within	some	
domain	have	failed	miserably,	each	attempt	would	as	progressive	by	his	lights	provided	that	
these	failed	attempts	later	led	to	the	development	of	a	known	theory.	By	contrast,	Bird	
explicitly	does	not	draw	this	conclusion	from	his	account	(see	Bird	2007:	73,	79-81).	Given	
																																								 																				
1	I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	alerting	me	to	the	relevance	of	the	exchange	between	Bird	and	
Rowbottom	to	this	issue.	
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this	difference,	I	will	refer	to	Park’s	version	of	the	epistemic	account	as	the	extended	
epistemic	account.	
There	is	an	immediate	difficulty	with	such	an	account.	As	Niiniluoto	(2015)	
emphasizes,	the	traditional	debate	about	scientific	progress	concerns	the	kind	of	progress	
that	is	made	in	science	with	regard	to	our	theories’	representation	of	the	world	–	what	
Niiniluoto	calls	cognitive	progress.	There	are	many	other	kinds	of	progress	in	science,	e.g.	
increased	or	better	funding	of	science	(economic	progress),	increased	skills	or	expertise	
among	scientists	(educational	progress),	and	better	methodologies	for	tackling	scientific	
questions	(methodological	progress).2	Thus,	in	the	relevant	sense,	an	account	of	scientific	
progress	is	really	an	account	of	cognitive	progress	in	science.	The	problem	this	creates	for	
Park’s	extended	epistemic	account	is	that	it	seems	that	most	of	these	other	kinds	of	progress	
in	science	would	in	fact	count	as	(cognitive)	scientific	progress	by	the	lights	of	the	extended	
epistemic	account.	More	generally,	the	underlying	problem	here	is	that	almost	anything	can	
count	as	progressive	on	the	extended	epistemic	account,	since	all	that’s	required	is	that	it	is	
a	“means	to”	acquiring	knowledge	sometime	in	the	future.	
Park	appears	to	be	aware	of	this	problem.	His	suggested	solution	is	to	restrict	his	
account	to	“episodes	that	involve	cognitive	changes”	(Park	2017:	570).	However,	it’s	not	
hard	to	see	that	this	modification	will	not	work,3	for	it	has	the	wrong	form:	An	account	of	
cognitive	progress	in	science	is	not	the	same	thing	as	an	account	of	progress	over	an	episode	
that	involves	cognitive	change.	This	somewhat	subtle	difference	can	be	brought	out	with	
examples	of	episodes	in	which	cognitive	change	does	take	place,	and	there	is	also	some	kind	
of	scientific	progress,	but	the	progress	in	question	is	not	cognitive.	For	example,	suppose	a	
powerful	new	funding	agency	agrees	to	double	the	financial	resources	of	an	entire	scientific	
discipline,	e.g.	evolutionary	biology,	but	only	on	the	condition	that	they	all	abandon	(i.e.	
cease	to	accept	or	believe)	the	theory	of	natural	selection	and	instead	adopt	(i.e.	start	
believing	or	accepting)	a	pseudo-scientific	theory,	e.g.	intelligent	design.4	Clearly,	we	do	not	
have	here	a	case	of	scientific	progress	in	the	sense	relevant	to	the	debate,	viz.	cognitive	
scientific	progress.	On	the	contrary,	the	episode	would	be	regressive	since	the	only	relevant	
cognitive	change	involves	abandoning	a	genuine	scientific	theory	for	a	pseudoscientific	
theory.	However,	this	type	of	episode	would	count	as	progressive	according	to	Park’s	
expanded	account	if,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	the	increased	funding	is	a	means	to	later	acquire	a	
great	deal	of	knowledge.5	This	is	clearly	the	wrong	result.	
For	this	reason,	it’s	a	mistake	for	epistemicists	about	scientific	progress	to	formulate	
the	thesis	in	terms	of	accumulating	means	to	achieving	knowledge.	In	other	words,	it’s	a	
																																								 																				
2	These	are	all	taken	from	Niiniluoto	(2015).	
3	Park’s	solution	is	also	extremely	ad	hoc,	since	only	rationale	for	restricting	the	account	in	this	way	is	that	
doing	so	is	meant	to	avoid	the	aforementioned	problem.	
4	As	the	parenthetical	remarks	here	indicate,	I	am	using	‘abandon’	and	‘adopt’	as	placeholder	terms	for	the	
propositional	attitude	that	undergoes	change	in	cognitive	scientific	progress.	For	Park	and	Bird,	this	attitude	is	
belief	(since	belief	is	necessary	for	knowledge);	for	Dellsén,	it	is	a	form	of	acceptance	(see	subsection	3.1	for	
further	discussion	of	this	difference).	
5	Indeed,	the	episode	would	count	as	progressive	according	to	Park’s	account	even	if	the	funding	is	merely	a	
means	to	acquire	a	little	bit	of	knowledge	(less	than	what	was	previously	lost),	since	that	would	still	satisfy	the	
second	disjunct	of	Park’s	disjunctive	account.	
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mistake	to	move	from	the	original	to	the	extended	epistemic	account.	Of	course,	the	same	
would	be	true	for	noeticists	–	they	shouldn’t	partly	formulate	their	theory	in	terms	of	means	
to	achieve	understanding	either.	This	does	not	mean	that	we	will	be	forced	to	ignore	
important	scientific	contributions	that	did	not	themselves	constitute	(cognitive)	scientific	
progress	but	were	essential	for	bringing	about	scientific	progress	at	some	later	date.	Rather,	
such	contributions	can	simply	be	classified	as	promoting	(cognitive)	scientific	progress.	Of	
course,	epistemicists	and	noeticists	will	have	different	accounts	of	what	counts	as	promoting	
progress	in	this	sense	–	for	epistemicists,	something	promotes	progress	when	it	facilitates	or	
leads	to	increased	knowledge;	for	noeticists,	something	promotes	progress	when	it	
facilitates	or	leads	to	increased	understanding.	The	epistemic	and	noetic	accounts	will	then	
be	evaluated	with	regard	to	whether	they	are	correct	in	their	verdicts	about	how	different	
episodes	(a)	constitute	scientific	progress,	(b)	promote	scientific	progress,	or	(c)	do	neither.	
In	what	follows,	I	argue	that	the	noetic	account	classifies	cases	into	(a),	(b)	and	(c)	in	a	more	
plausible	way	than	the	epistemic	account	–	Park’s	criticism	notwithstanding.	
	
3.	Responses	to	Park’s	objections	
I	now	turn	to	responding	to	Park’s	objections	one	by	one.	
	
3.1.	Is	Belief	Necessary	for	Understanding	and	Progress?	
Park	starts	by	objecting	to	Dellsén’s	contention	that	belief	is	not	required	for	scientific	
understanding	(and	thus	for	progress,	on	Dellsén’s	noetic	account).	On	Dellsén’s	view,	
understanding	involves	not	belief	but	a	kind	of	acceptance	for	understanding-related	
purposes,	where	acceptance	is	understood	in	L.J.	Cohen’s	(1992)	sense	as	adopting	or	having	
a	policy	of	treating	something	as	true	in	a	given	context	(Dellsén	2016:	76;	see	also	2017b,	
2018).	Now,	Park’s	argument	against	Dellsén	seems	to	be	that	if	someone	merely	accepts,	
but	does	not	believe,	a	proposition	that’s	e.g.	used	in	an	explanation,	“their	peers	might	
suspect	that	their	…	understandings	…	do	not	reflect	the	world”	(Park	2017:	573).	This	is	
because,	says	Park,	if	the	peers	in	question	were	to	ask	the	person	if	she	believed	the	
theories	on	the	basis	of	which	she	understands,	she	would	have	to	admit	that	she	merely	
accepts,	but	does	not	believe,	those	theories	(Park	2017:	572-3).	
	 This	argument	is	not	convincing.	One	important	point	about	Cohen’s	(and,	by	
extension,	Dellsén’s)	belief/acceptance	distinction	is	that	it	is	not	meant	to	correspond	to	
how	people	use	the	terms	‘belief’	and	‘acceptance’	in	ordinary	language.	Rather,	it	is	meant	
to	reflect	a	subtle	difference	in	the	attitudes	we	might	take	towards	propositions.	We	might	
voluntary	take	them	for	granted	in	a	specific	context	(acceptance),	or	simply	involuntarily	
take	them	to	be	true	regardless	of	context	(belief).6	Thus	when	someone	asks	for	our	
																																								 																				
6	Of	course,	this	is	not	the	only	possible	way	to	define	the	terms	‘belief’	and	‘acceptance’	(see	Schwitzgebel	
(2015)	for	a	number	of	competing	conceptions	of	the	nature	of	belief).	However,	it	is	safe	to	say	that	belief	is	
generally	taken	to	be	involuntary	in	an	important	way	(see	Williams	(1973)	and	Alston	(1988)	for	influential	
discussions);	furthermore,	belief	is	not	generally	taken	to	be	context-sensitive	in	the	way	acceptance	is	on	
Cohen’s	definition	(on	this	point,	see	Dellsén	2018:	13).	
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opinions	about	something,	e.g.	with	a	question	like	‘What	do	you	think	about	X?’,	the	
answer	might	reflect	either	our	beliefs	or	our	acceptances,	depending	on	context.	In	a	
scientific	context,	i.e.	when	someone	is	asked	for	their	opinion	qua	scientist	(or,	as	van	
Fraassen	(1980:	12)	puts	it,	when	the	scientist	is	speaking	ex	cathedra),7	the	answer	would	
reflect	what	they	accept	rather	than	what	they	believe.		Moreover,	it	is	not	as	if	one	of	these	
attitudes	is	the	scientist’s	‘real’	or	‘considered’	opinion	about	something,	nor	is	it	the	case	
that	only	one	of	these	attitudes	is	sensitive	to	evidence.	Indeed,	there	are	circumstances	in	
which	we	cannot	bring	ourselves	to	believe	a	proposition	that	we	nevertheless	realize	is	
supported	by	our	evidence.	In	that	case,	we	might	accept	the	proposition	–	e.g.,	in	a	
scientific	context	–	even	if	we	do	not	believe	it.	(For	an	example	of	this	sort,	see	Dellsén’s	
case	of	the	deeply	religious	evolutionary	biologist	who	cannot	bring	herself	to	believe	the	
theory	of	natural	selection,	but	nevertheless	accepts	it	(Dellsén	2017a:	100-101).)	
	 Given	this,	it	should	be	clear	that	it	is	simply	false	that	a	scientist	who	is	asked	by	her	
peers	if	she	really	believes	something	would	need	to	say	that	she	does	not	believe	it.	At	
most,	what	she	would	need	to	do	is	explain	exactly	what	her	attitude	is	towards	the	theory,	
but	at	no	point	should	that	lead	her	peers	to	conclude	that	her	understandings	do	not	reflect	
the	world.	If	her	peers	are	reasonable,	they	should	let	their	judgment	on	this	question	be	
determined	by	their	estimation	of	whether	the	scientist’s	attitude	towards	the	theory	(be	it	
acceptance	or	belief)	is	based	on	sufficient	evidence,	sound	methodology,	and	so	forth.	It	is	
completely	irrelevant	for	this	kind	of	estimation	whether	the	scientist’s	attitude	is	a	
voluntary	context-dependent	one	(acceptance)	or	an	involuntary	context-independent	one	
(belief).8	
	
3.2.	Is	Justification	Necessary	for	Understanding	and	Progress?	
Park	goes	on	to	object	to	Dellsén’s	argument	that	epistemic	justification	is	not	necessary	for	
scientific	progress.9	Dellsén’s	point	is	that	there	are	examples	of	scientific	progress	in	which	
the	relevant	scientists	were	not	(at	the	time)	justified	in	believing	the	proposed	theory	to	the	
extent	required	for	knowledge.	To	illustrate	his	point,	Dellsén	uses	a	real	historical	example	
of	Einstein’s	explanation	of	Brownian	motion	in	terms	of	the	kinetic	theory	of	heat	and	the	
atomic	theory	of	matter.	In	this	case,	both	the	explanans	and	the	explanandum	were	
																																								 																				
7	It	is	worth	noting	that	if	Park’s	objection	to	Dellsén	were	correct,	it	would	also	serve	as	an	objection	to	van	
Fraassen’s	constructive	empiricism.		
8	Park	also	claims	that	“[w]hen	scientists	explain	something	in	terms	of	a	scientific	theory,	they	believe	that	it	
[viz.,	the	explanandum]	is	real”	(Park	2017:	573).	This	appears	to	be	an	empirical	claim	about	all	scientists’	
mental	states	when	engaging	in	a	specific	activity,	viz.	explanation.	If	so,	it	is	almost	certainly	false	given	the	
existence	of	openly	anti-realist	scientists,	such	as	Niels	Bohr,	who	surely	engaged	in	the	practice	of	explaining	
various	phenomena	even	though	they	did	not	believe	that	the	relevant	theories	were	true	(see	Folse	(1985)	
and	Faye	(1991)	for	more	on	Bohr’s	views	on	the	truth	of	his	theories).	It	would	be	even	less	plausible	to	claim	
that	this	is	some	sort	of	conceptual	truth,	since	it	is	clearly	possible	to	explain	with	a	theory	you	merely	accept	
in	Cohen	and	Dellsén’s	sense	of	the	term	(but	do	not	also	believe).	
9	Rowbottom	(2010)	also	argues	that	justification	is	not	necessary	for	scientific	progress,	but	in	a	different	way.	
Whereas	Dellsén	appeals	to	cases	in	which	scientists	arguably	make	progress	in	virtue	of	accurately	explaining	
and/or	predicting	more	than	they	previously	could,	Rowbottom	(2010:	245-7)	appeals	to	cases	in	which	
scientific	theories	become	more	theoretically	virtuous	in	Kuhn’s	(1977)	sense.	
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unjustified	(albeit	correct),	even	by	Einstein’s	own	lights.	Thus,	argues	Dellsén,	Einstein	
cannot	be	said	to	have	given	us	knowledge	via	his	explanation,	and	so	the	episode	cannot	
count	as	progressive	by	epistemicists’s	lights.	Things	looks	very	differently	from	the	point	of	
view	of	the	noetic	account,	since	Einstein	clearly	gave	us	understanding	of	Brownian	motion.	
Park’s	response	is	not	to	dispute	that	the	explanans	and	explanandum	of	Einstein’s	
explanation	were	unjustified	at	the	time,	but	to	invoke	his	“means-end	thesis”	to	argue	that	
Einstein’s	contribution	“served	as	a	means	to	establish	the	existence	of	molecules	in	the	
subsequent	research	by	Jean	Perrin	in	1908”	(Park	2017:	574).	Park	gives	a	similar	response	
to	another	example	of	Dellsén’s	in	which	an	unjustified	theory	was	used	for	understanding,	
viz.	Wegener’s	proposal	of	his	continental	drift	theory	(Dellsén	2016:	80).	
	 We	have	already	seen	what	is	wrong	with	this	type	of	response.	If	the	means-ends	
thesis	is	incorporated	into	an	account	of	scientific	progress	itself,	as	per	what	I	have	called	
the	extended	epistemic	account,	then	the	account	is	unable	to	make	crucial	distinctions	
between	cognitive	and	non-cognitive	scientific	progress	–	and	indeed,	seems	to	end	up	
having	to	say	that	anything	can	count	as	scientific	progress.	To	avoid	this,	epistemicists	can	
instead	say	(as	I	have	in	effect	suggested	that	they	should)	that	the	aforementioned	
episodes	featuring	Einstein	and	Wegener	should	be	classified	as	cases	in	which	scientific	
progress	was	promoted	(rather	than	achieved).	However,	note	that	proponents	of	the	noetic	
account	need	not	make	the	same	concession;	rather,	they	can	continue	to	maintain	that	
Einstein	and	Wegener	achieved	scientific	progress	during	these	episodes.	Since	this	is	the	
judgment	that	Park	himself	seems	to	make	about	the	two	cases	(Park	2017:	573-4),	this	has	
to	count	in	favor	of	the	noetic	account	as	against	the	epistemic	account.	In	sum,	then,	
examples	of	this	kind	still	favor	the	noetic	account,	as	per	Dellsén’s	original	argument.	
	
3.3.	Is	Knowledge	Sufficient	for	Understanding	and	Progress?	
Park’s	next	two	arguments	against	Dellsén	concern	whether	knowledge	is	sufficient	for	
understanding	and	scientific	progress,	respectively.	Dellsén	(2016:	76)	briefly	suggests	that	
knowing	individual	propositions,	e.g.	the	propositions	that	occur	in	an	explanans	and	
explanandum,	would	not	suffice	for	understanding	if	one	failed	to	grasp	how	to	actually	go	
about	putting	these	propositions	together	in	the	relevant	explanation.	For	example,	one	may	
know	the	height	of	a	flagpole,	the	length	of	its	shadow,	the	position	of	the	sun,	and	the	
rectilinear	propagation	of	light,	and	still	not	be	able	to	explain	or	predict	the	length	of	the	
flagpole’s	shadow.	Park’s	response	is	to	grant	that	you	would	not	have	understanding	in	this	
case,	but	to	insist	that	what	is	missing	is	simply	more	knowledge	of	a	certain	kind	–	viz.,	what	
he	calls	“inferential	knowledge”	(Park	2017:	575).	In	this	case,	the	inferential	knowledge	in	
question	consists	in	“know[ing]	how	the	explanandum	follows	from	the	explanantia”	(Park	
2017:	575).	So,	Park	argues,	if	you	have	all	the	knowledge	relevant	to	an	explanation	of	the	
flagpole’s	shadow	–	i.e.,	knowledge	of	the	explanandum	and	explanantia,	in	addition	to	the	
relevant	inferential	knowledge	–	you	will	understand	after	all.	
	 Dellsén	could	resist	this	argument	by	denying	that	what	Park	is	calling	“inferential	
knowledge”	is	knowledge	of	the	same	kind	as	that	countenanced	by	the	original	epistemic	
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account.	After	all,	the	kind	of	knowledge	that	Bird’s	epistemic	account	takes	to	be	
constitutive	of	scientific	progress	is	propositional	knowledge	(knowledge	of	the	propositions	
that	constitute	scientific	theories),	whereas	Park’s	“inferential	knowledge”	appears	to	be	a	
species	of	know-how.10	Of	course,	there	are	those	who	want	to	reduce	know-how	to	
propositional	knowledge	(e.g.,	Stanley	and	Williamson	2001),	but	the	more	traditional	view	
is	that	know-how	is	a	kind	of	ability,	and	thus	by	nature	non-propositional.	If	so,	Park’s	reply	
essentially	trades	on	an	ambiguity	in	the	word	‘know’.	However,	let	me	set	that	possible	
reply	aside	here,	and	simply	grant	Park	the	claim	that	this	kind	of	“inferential	knowledge”	
should	count	as	knowledge	in	the	same	sense	in	which	the	epistemic	account	is	using	the	
term,	i.e.	as	a	species	of	propositional	knowledge.	What	would	be	the	upshots	of	that	for	the	
epistemic	account	of	scientific	progress?	
	 Interestingly,	Dellsén	(2016:	77)	already	considered	a	related	question	when	
responding	to	a	hypothetical	objection	to	his	argument.	There,	Dellsén	used	the	term	
hypothetical	explanatory	knowledge	to	describe	“knowledge	of	how	a	potential	explanans	
would	explain	a	potential	explanandum	if	the	explanans	and	explanandum	are	both	true”	
(2016:	77).	It	should	be	clear	that	the	differences	between	this	and	Park’s	“inferential	
knowledge”,	if	any,	are	irrelevant	to	our	current	concerns.	Now,	Dellsén	argued	that	the	
epistemic	account	cannot	count	increases	in	this	kind	of	hypothetical	explanatory	knowledge	
as	constituting	genuine	scientific	progress,	since	it	is	“far	more	common	than	genuine	
scientific	progress”	(2016:	77).	He	illustrated	the	point	with	the	example	–	a	variation	on	one	
that	was	proposed	by	Bird	himself	as	a	clear	case	of	non-progress	–	of	a	possible	
‘explanation’	of	why	hot	goat’s	blood	would	split	diamonds	according	to	a	theory	proposed	
by	Nicole	d’Oresme.	Even	if	Oresme’s	theory	was	radically	false	and	his	proposed	
explanandum	non-existent,	Oresme	could	well	have	gained	hypothetical	explanatory	
knowledge	(in	Dellsén’s	sense)	and	inferential	knowledge	(in	Park’s	sense).	Since	we	surely	
do	not	want	to	say	that	Oresme	achieved	scientific	progress	in	this	case,	an	epistemicist	
cannot	count	hypothetical	explanatory	knowledge	(i.e.	inferential	knowledge)	as	the	kind	of	
knowledge	that	the	epistemic	account	takes	to	be	constitutive	of	scientific	progress.	At	the	
end	of	the	day,	then,	Park’s	idea	of	including	“inferential	knowledge”	as	a	knowledge	of	the	
relevant	kind	weakens	rather	than	strengthens	the	epistemic	account	of	scientific	progress.	
	 Park	also	argues	against	one	of	Dellsén’s	arguments	that	increases	in	knowledge	are	
not	sufficient	for	progress.	Dellsén’s	argument	(2016:	78)	is	that	scientists	could	increase	
knowledge	by	gathering	information	about	utterly	spurious	statistical	correlations,	such	as	
that	between	childbirth	rates	and	stork	populations	around	a	given	city.	By	contrast,	Dellsén	
contends	that	such	an	accumulation	of	knowledge	would	not	amount	to	understanding,	
precisely	because	the	correlations	are	spurious	and	thus	incapable	of	supporting	correct	
explanations	or	reliable	predictions.	For	example,	one	could	not	explain	increases	in	
childbirth	rates	in	terms	of	increased	stork	populations,	or	vice	versa.	According	to	Dellsén,	
																																								 																				
10	Mizrahi	(2013)	argues	that	scientific	progress	often	consists	in	increasing	know-how,	and	argues	for	
‘expanding’	the	notion	of	scientific	knowledge	to	include	both	propositional	knowledge	and	know-how	in	order	
to	accommodate	this	point	within	a	broadly-speaking	epistemic	account.	
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this	thus	counts	as	a	case	that	the	epistemic	account	gets	wrong	and	the	noetic	account	gets	
right	–	a	consideration	against	the	former	and	in	favor	of	the	latter.	
Park’s	objection	to	this	argument	is	that	“the	same	criticism	can	be	leveled	at	the	
noetic	approach”	(2017:	576).	To	show	this,	Park	considers	an	example	of	a	research	
proposal	that	“outlines	explanations	of	why	one	million	individuals	have	the	numbers	of	
hairs	on	their	heads	that	they	have”	(2017:	576).	Park	claims	that	this	research	“will	yield	
understandings	of	why	one	million	individuals	have	the	numbers	of	hairs	that	they	have,	but	
will	impress	neither	funding	agencies	nor	scientific	journals”	(2017:	576).	Park’s	case	is	a	
little	underdescribed	as	it	stands	–	it	is	not	clear,	for	example,	whether	the	research	in	
question	would	use	scientific	methodology	and	whether	the	kind	of	explanations	involved	
would	naturally	be	classified	as	scientific	explanations.	But	supposing	that	these	questions	
are	answered	in	the	affirmative,	it’s	hard	to	deny	that	the	research	could	yield	scientific	
understanding	of	why	each	of	the	million	people	have	the	number	of	hairs	they	in	fact	have.	
In	that	case,	it	would	indeed	have	to	be	counted	as	constituting	scientific	progress	by	the	
lights	of	the	noetic	account.11	
The	first	and	most	obvious	response	to	this	objection	is	that	it	would	not,	even	if	
successful,	establish	parity	between	the	noetic	and	epistemic	accounts.	After	all,	even	if	we	
accept	everything	Park	says	about	the	example,	Dellsén’s	original	childbirth/stork	example	
would	still	count	against	the	epistemic	account	and	in	favor	of	the	noetic	account.	If	
successful,	Park’s	number-of-hairs	example	counts	against	the	noetic	account,	but	of	course	
it	also	counts	just	as	forcefully	against	the	epistemic	account	itself	(since	there	is	nothing	in	
the	example	that	prevents	us	from	assuming	that	these	explanations	would	yield	
knowledge).	In	effect,	then,	what	Park	has	done	is	to	try	to	save	the	epistemic	account	from	
Dellsén’s	original	childbirth/stork	example	by	pointing	to	a	new	case	that	(if	successful)	
would	undermine	the	noetic	account	and	the	epistemic	account	equally.	Hence	the	noetic	
account	would	still	come	out	on	top,	all	things	considered.	
Moreover,	it	seems	to	me	that	proponents	of	the	noetic	account	(and,	indeed,	
proponents	of	the	epistemic	account)	have	the	resources	to	treat	Park’s	number-of-hairs	
example	in	a	quite	satisfactory	manner	–	a	treatment	that	is	not	available	in	Dellsén’s	
childbirth/stork	example.	The	idea	would	be	that	the	number-of-hairs	research	would	count	
as	scientific	progress,	but	as	an	instance	of	scientific	progress	on	an	issue	or	question	that	
we	find	uninteresting,	unilluminating,	or	otherwise	insignificant.	Not	all	instances	of	
scientific	progress	are	equal	–	some	are	simply	more	desirable	than	others.	Put	differently,	
we	care	more	about	making	scientific	progress	on	some	issues	than	on	others.	Thus	the	
reason	why	the	number-of-hairs	research	would,	as	Park	puts	it,	“impress	neither	funding	
agencies	or	scientific	journals”	(Park	2017:	576)	is	quite	simply	because	they	are	not	
interested	making	progress	into	that	issue.	Notice	that	this	type	of	response	it	not	available	
in	the	childbirth/stork	example,	where	it	is	not	that	the	issue	or	question	is	uninteresting	or	
																																								 																				
11	That	said,	it	might	only	count	as	very	modest	progress.	Recall	that	progress	is	a	matter	of	degree,	and	so	the	
fact	that	such	research	would	constitute	some	progress	is	compatible	with	the	degree	of	progress	being	
miniscule.	
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unimportant	(it	is	important	to	understand	childbirth	rates),	but	that	the	type	of	information	
or	representation	we	would	get	about	that	issue	is	by	its	very	nature	lacking	or	deficient.12	
	
3.4.	Idealizations	and	Simplicity	
Finally,	I	will	briefly	address	Park’s	objections	to	two	of	Dellsén’s	“further	advantages”	of	his	
noetic	account.13	
The	first	of	these	concerns	idealizations	that	eliminate	or	exaggerate	explanatorily	
irrelevant	factors	in	order	to	emphasize	core	explanatory	features	–	so-called	‘minimalist	
idealizations’	(Weisberg	2007:	642-645).	Dellsén	contends	that	these	may	increase	
understanding	even	when	more	accurate	(i.e.	less	idealized)	alternatives	are	available,	but	
that	this	clearly	does	not	amount	to	increasing	knowledge.	Park’s	objection	is	to	appeal	to	
his	means-end	thesis,	arguing	that	discovering	such	idealizations	would	count	as	progressive	
on	his	extended	epistemic	account	“given	that	they	facilitate	inferences	about	observables,	
and	that	those	inferences	are	accompanied	by	an	accumulation	of	observational	knowledge”	
(Park	2017:	577).	My	response	to	Park’s	objection	will	be	predictable	at	this	point:	I	have	
argued	that	Park’s	means-end	thesis	is	untenable	as	part	of	an	account	of	scientific	progress	
(see	section	2),	so	even	if	the	idealizations	in	question	facilitate	inferences	about	
observables,	we	still	would	not	have	scientific	progress	in	these	cases	on	a	plausible	
epistemic	account.	At	most,	these	idealizations	would	promote	scientific	progress.	However,	
Park	himself	seems	to	acknowledge	that	at	least	some	of	these	idealizations	should	count	as	
constituting	scientific	progress	(Park	2017:	577).	
	 The	second	of	the	two	of	Dellsén’s	“further	advantages”	that	are	discussed	by	Park	
concerns	pragmatic	virtues	of	scientific	theories,	i.e.	virtues	that	do	not	make	the	theory	
more	probable	but	instead	make	it	easier	to	conceptualize	or	utilize	the	theory.	In	Dellsén’s	
view,	theoretical	simplicity	–	i.e.,	the	simplicity	with	which	a	theory	is	formulated	(to	be	
distinguished	from	ontological	simplicity,	defined	in	terms	of	the	number	of	entities	posited	
by	the	theory)	–	is	a	pragmatic	virtue	in	this	sense.	Now,	Dellsén	contends	that	theoretical	
simplicity	may	contribute	to	understanding,	and	thus	to	scientific	progress	on	the	noetic	
view,	in	that	it	may	be	possible	to	explain	or	predict	phenomena	that	cannot	be	explained	or	
predicted	with	more	complex	theories.	By	contrast,	theoretical	simplicity	cannot	contribute	
to	knowledge,	since	it	is	(assumed	to	be)	a	purely	pragmatic	virtue.	Park	(2017:	578)	objects	
that,	via	his	means-end	thesis,	theoretical	simplicity	may	count	as	contributing	to	progress	
since	it	will	be	easier	to	derive	observational	consequences	from	the	simpler	theory	than	
from	the	more	complex	one.	Once	again,	my	response	is	that	Park’s	means-end	thesis	must	
be	rejected	for	independent	reasons.	At	most,	Park	can	claim	that	replacing	a	more	complex	
theory	with	a	simpler	one	promotes	(rather	than	constitutes)	scientific	progress.	But,	again,	
																																								 																				
12	This	idea	could	clearly	be	developed	in	more	detail,	e.g.	by	spelling	out	exactly	what	an	issue	or	question	is	in	
this	context	and	what	makes	it	important,	but	I	lack	the	space	to	do	so	here.	Besides,	since	the	response	is	
essentially	one	that	both	noeticists	and	epistemicists	should	welcome,	the	issue	is	really	quite	independent	of	
the	adjudication	of	the	noetic	versus	the	epistemic	view	of	progress	that	I	am	concerned	with	here.	
13	Dellsén	briefly	presents	three	such	considerations	at	the	very	end	of	his	paper	(Dellsén	2016:	81-2).	Park	
does	not	discuss	the	third	advantage,	having	to	do	with	the	epistemic	value	of	understanding	and	knowledge.	
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this	option	seems	not	to	be	open	to	Park,	since	he	explicitly	asserts	that	choosing	the	simpler	
theory	over	the	more	complex	one	“constitutes	scientific	progress”	(Park	2017:	578).	
	
4.	Conclusion	
Park	(2017)	presents	several	objections	to	Dellsén’s	(2016)	noetic	account	of	scientific	
progress	and	to	his	arguments	in	favor	of	the	noetic	account	as	against	Bird’s	(2007,	2015)	
epistemic	account.	I	have	argued	that	none	of	these	objections	succeeds.	An	important	take-
home	message	is	that	accounts	of	(cognitive)	scientific	progress	cannot	count	just	anything	
that	promotes	scientific	progress	as	itself	instances	of	progress.	In	particular,	the	epistemic	
account	cannot	simply	be	extended	so	as	to	count	any	means	to	knowledge	as	constituting	
progress	in	the	relevant	sense.		Instead,	we	should	simply	distinguish	between	episodes	that	
constitute	and	promote	scientific	progress,	and	evaluate	account	of	scientific	progress	in	
terms	of	how	they	classify	different	episodes	with	respect	to	these	categories.	 	
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